The Plea for Asia—Tan Yunshan, Pan-Asianism and Sino-Indian Relations by Tsui, Brian Kai Hin
The Plea for Asia 353
China Report 46, 4 (2010): 353–370 
CHINA REPORT 46 : 4 (2010): 353–370
SAGE Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/000944551104600403
The Plea for Asia—Tan Yunshan, 
Pan-Asianism and Sino-Indian Relations
Brian Tsui
In 1927, the Buddhist scholar, Tan Yunshan, travelled to Santiniketan on the invitation of Rabindranath 
Tagore to teach Chinese at Visva Bharati University. Subsequent years would see him develop close ties 
with the Guomindang and Congress leaders, secure Chinese state funding for the fi rst sinological institute 
in India and mediate between the nationalist movements during the Second World War. That a relatively 
marginal academic, who participated in neither the May Fourth Movement nor any major political 
party, and who had little prior experience of India, could have played such an important role in twentieth 
century Sino-Indian relations raises questions over the conditions that made possible Tan’s illustrious 
career. This article argues that Tan’s success as an institution builder and diplomatic intermediary was 
attributable to his ideological affi nity with the increasing disillusionment with capitalist modernity in 
both China and India, the shifting dynamics of the Pan-Asianist movement and the conservative turn 
of China’s nationalist movement after its split with the communists in 1927. While Nationalist China 
and the Congress both tapped into the civilizational discourse that was supposed to bind the two societies 
together, the idealism Tan embodied was unable to withstand the confl ict of priorities between nation-
states in the emerging Cold War order.
The academic Tan Yunshan (1898–1983) played a pivotal role in Sino-Indian relations 
before the advent of the Indian nation-state. As an individual, Tan might have preferred 
that his efforts focused on promoting educational ties between the two countries. Yet, 
Tan never strayed too far from politics. After all, Tan operated in a world dominated 
by formal and ‘informal’ empires, an Asia where liaisons between political movements 
across societies had to depend on such cosmopolitan fi gures like himself. Whereas 
‘apolitical’ traders, professionals and academics could travel relatively freely between 
Asian societies thanks to the looming presence of Pax Britannica, movement was more 
restricted for nationalist activists who wished to communicate with each other on how 
to put an end to colonialism. The relationship between semi-colonial China and British 
India was no exception. That a private citizen was to occupy a signifi cant mediating 
role in bringing the two movements together was hardly surprising. 
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Yet, as an individual, Tan was no natural candidate for being the premier inter-
mediary between Nationalist China and the Indian National Congress. Tan received a 
modern education in his native Hunan province (C. Tan 1999; L. Tan 1999).1 Before 
joining Visva Bharati as a lecturer in Chinese studies, he was a publisher, newspaper 
editor and educator, but had little knowledge and experience of India. Spending 
much of his earlier life in Hunan and Malaya, Tan was unfamiliar with the cultural 
scenes of Beijing and Shanghai—the two centres of modern Chinese intellectual and 
political experimentations. A classmate of Mao Zedong regardless, Tan stayed away 
from organized party politics, and never became a member of either the Guomindang 
(GMD) or the Chinese Communist Party. While a supporter of the modern vernacular, 
Tan was not among the New Culture intellectual radicals or party activists who went 
on to occupy important positions in the educational and political institutions under 
Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government. As far as the tumultuous political and cul-
tural life of early twentieth century China is concerned, Tan Yunshan was a marginal 
academic who was socially and geographical removed from the centres of gravity.
Under a changed set of circumstances, however, Tan’s peripheral status vis-à-vis 
China’s intellectual radicalism was to make him an ideal operator in Sino-Indian 
interactions in lieu of state-to-state diplomacy. It is these circumstances that constitute 
the subject matter of my article. I argue that personal acumen and tenacity aside, a 
convergence of shifting political and ideological forces in China and beyond, from the 
late 1920s, worked to bring the two nationalist movements together, a process to which 
Tan was eminently capable of contributing. These favourable conditions included the 
increasing unease with capitalist modernity in the institutionalized nationalisms of 
both societies; the shifting dynamics of the Pan-Asianist movement in view of Japan’s 
continental adventurism; and the drastic conservative turn of the GMD after being 
hijacked by its fervently anti-communist right wing. The break-up of the GMD’s 
alliance with the communists resulted in the former’s retreat from not only radical social 
programmes but also Communist International (Comintern)-sponsored anti-colonial 
activities. Having renounced anti-imperialist internationalism, the GMD, still seeing 
itself as a revolutionary party, privileged civilizational affi nities in its engagements with 
other colonized Asian peoples. Tan’s ambiguous politics and distance from May Fourth 
radicalism appealed to the GMD’s conservative cosmopolitanism. 
By examining the wider historical milieu that shaped Tan’s career, this article seeks 
to supplement the few comprehensive biographical accounts of this remarkable fi gure. 
In addition, I hope this article will contribute to an assessment of the cosmopolitan 
anti-colonial programme Tan embodied—one based on romanticized pre-colonial ties 
between civilizations, desires for the revival of Asia and an idealist commitment to global 
unity. Just as Sino-Indian alliance was facilitated by schisms in the imagined solidarity 
among Asian peoples due to Japan’s geopolitical designs in the 1930s, Nationalist 
1 For biographical introductions to Tan Yunshan’s career, see the contributions of his sons, Tan Lee and 
Tan Chung, in C. Tan (1999) and L. Tan (1999).
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China’s relations with independent India were marred by the diverging positions of the 
two nation-states in the emerging Cold War order, despite the continued evocation of 
their supposed inalienable religious and cultural bonds. Confronting the nature and 
limits of the fragile GMD–Congress alliance is of utmost importance, not least because 
deep engagement between cultures continues to be evoked as a possible alternative 
to calculations of economic and strategic interests that defi ne interactions between 
nation-states today.
RETURN TO ASIA
It is hard to imagine that Tan, in spite of his distance from Chinese intellectual life, 
was unaware of the politics with which he was associating himself when he accepted 
Tagore’s invitation to teach at Visva Bharati in 1927. If nothing else, Tan would have 
recalled Tagore’s controversial visit to China in 1923. Amidst the effl orescence of 
social radicalism in anticipation of the revolutionary alliance between the GMD and 
the recently formed Chinese Communist Party, the reception of Tagore among young 
Chinese intellectuals was unenthusiastic, if not downright hostile. Widely revered 
in Europe and in much of Japan, the fi rst Asian recipient of the Nobel Prize for 
Literature was enmeshed in the polarized cultural politics of the May Fourth period, 
being identifi ed with the traditional Eastern spirituality embraced by the Late Qing 
reformer Liang Qichao, who headed the literary association behind the visit. That 
Tagore insisted throughout his trip that he was nothing more than a poet wishing for 
the revival of China and Asia’s great spirit did not help relieve the anxieties of political 
radicals, who saw in the towering Bengali visitor vindication for either a nostalgic 
‘return’ to the comfort of an idealized traditional order or an aestheticist withdrawal 
from the social ills that required nothing less than fundamental changes. While most 
Chinese intellectuals had high regard for the Nobel laureate’s literary accomplishments, 
particularly his contributions to the modern Bengali vernacular literature, Tagore’s 
cosmopolitan catholicity did not go down well with the left wing of the May Fourth 
generation. Tagore’s well-advertised aversion to mass mobilization and his critique of 
nationalism were anathema to a communist party about to take on board and radicalize 
Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist agendas. The communist intellectual Qu Qiubai, for instance, 
faulted Tagore not mainly for the latter’s elevation of Oriental spirituality but for his 
cavalier dismissal of the nation-state (guojia) as a potent means to mobilize the masses 
for anti-imperialist and progressive endeavours (Qu 1988: 511–59). 
It was thus not until four years after his disappointing visit that Tagore would fi nd 
a Chinese ideological companion in Tan Yunshan. The young scholar, unimpressed 
with the social radicalism of his peers who gathered around Marxist study groups and 
the two major political parties, went to British Malaya in 1924 and became a teacher 
and newspaper editor with the Chinese community. Tan’s serious interest in Buddhism 
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began two years earlier, when he was baptized under Master Taixu, the pre-eminent 
Buddhist modernist in Republican China. Intriguingly, Taixu’s involvement in the 
republican revolutionary movement, and his eclectic programme bringing together 
the idealist tenets of the Faxiang School and Henri Bergson’s vitalism, appealed to 
intellectuals on not only the right but also the left, such as the early Qu Qiubai 
(Cheung 2007: 56–70). While Qu would eventually convert to historical materialism 
and advocate proletarian revolution, Tan’s Buddhism was to inform his analysis of the 
relevance of Sino-Indian interaction to a world fraught by the spiritual crisis brought 
about by liberal capitalism. 
The Great War, better known in China as the ‘European War’ (Ou zhan), redrew the 
political contours of the early twentieth century world. In the wake of the prolonged 
orgy of violence, liberal ideologies of linear progress, evolutionism and positivism and 
the institutions of capitalist modernity were challenged not only by Marxist revolu-
tionaries but also by the radical right. Intellectuals like Bergson, Oswald Spengler and 
Martin Heidegger provided ideological ammunition for the politics of conservative 
revolution—a ‘return’ to the communitarian ethos of organic nations and an urge to 
overcome the dehumanizing effects of capitalism while keeping the private property 
system mostly intact. In China, Bergson, Spengler and the conservative humanist, Irving 
Babbitt, were touted by Liang Qichao, Zhang Junmai and others committed to the 
search for a ‘humanistic’ alternative to state socialist and liberal capitalist modernities. 
Civilization discourse became an important feature in non-revolutionary critiques 
of the Enlightenment project. The resultant politics is ridden with contradictions. 
Prasenjit Duara observes that desire for a superior universal order to Enlightenment 
civilization was a core element of anti-imperialist projects and that even the bourgeois 
nationalist quest for a territorially bound, culturally distinct nation-state contains 
within itself impulses of transcendence (Duara 2003: 91–96). The peripatetic lay 
Buddhist embodied this contradiction of interwar civilization discourse. Furthermore, 
civilization, even as an analytical category targeting particular societies, is conceived 
of as describing an ‘undetermined’ collective subjectivity that stands aloof from social 
and economic processes (Sartori 2008: 37–38). While the inherent ambiguities of 
Tan’s Pan-Asianist dismissal of the West distanced the man’s ideas from racist or overtly 
nationalist sentiments, the metaphysical neglect of social relations and privileging of 
cultural revivalism as anti-colonialist strategy would nonetheless endear Tan to the 
post-1927 nationalist regime, as the party–state reneged on its recent progressive past 
and worked to neutralize the ‘threat’ of communist revolution.
GMD’S CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION AND THE QUEST FOR DATONG
Tan Yunshan’s cordial relationship with Nanjing began as late as 1930, when he joined 
a delegation of nationalist state representatives on a mission to Lhasa. Fresh from 
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the victory of the Northern Expedition, Nanjing was anxious to assert claims over 
the fi nancially impoverished but independently governed Tibet (Lin 2006: 51–71). 
The dramatic trip saw Tan play, for the fi rst time, the role of unoffi cial diplomat, as 
Chiang Kai-shek’s envoy, Xie Guoliang, died from illness before setting foot on Tibetan 
territory. Aside from delivering Chiang’s messages to the Dalai Lama, Tan authored 
a report to Nanjing lamenting how it was disgraceful that Chinese nationals had to 
travel to purportedly Chinese soil via British India (Zhu 2006: 107–16). Thus, in 
1931 when Tan acted on Tagore’s vision, alluding to the Buddhist monk Xuanzang’s 
pilgrimage to India during the seventh century, to ‘re-establish’ ties between the two 
cultures, he already had access to the upper echelons of the GMD state. The senior 
GMD functionary behind Nanjing’s funding of Cheena Bhavana, Dai Jitao, would 
have known of Tan not least because of the former’s own interest in frontier affairs 
(bianzheng).
Dai, then head of the largely powerless Examination Yuan, was more well known 
as theoretician of the GMD right and for his interest in Buddhism. A former socialist 
and translator of Karl Kautsky, Dai provided important ideological ammunition for 
the right-wing coup d’état that ousted the communists from the GMD. The 1927 coup 
marked the GMD’s shift from a vanguard of the radicalized nationalist revolution 
(guomin geming) to the agent of what might be called China’s ‘conservative revolution’. 
According to Dai’s theorization, a GMD rid of communist infl uence would be a better 
weapon against capitalist excesses (Dai 1951). Like most right-wing movements that 
began their careers on the left, the GMD did not repudiate socialism outright but 
claimed to incorporate its principles (Neocleous 1997: 38–40). Thus, Dai argued 
that Sun Yat-sen’s ‘principle of livelihood’ (minsheng zhuyi) encapsulated the same ideals 
as socialism, only that the means to achieving these goals were different. These means 
included state management of productive forces, harnessing the nation’s collective 
will, but defi nitely not the abolition of private property (Dai 1951: 7, 19). Indeed, 
by obliterating class politics and actively suppressing the revolutionary agency of the 
proletariat, the GMD, after 1927, was committed to an anti-revolutionary revolution. 
Given the GMD’s appropriation of socialism, one could easily imagine the polarized 
reception in China of what Tan remembered as Tagore’s uniquely perceptive ‘advice’ 
to radicalized Chinese youth in 1934: don’t adopt the Soviet system, for China had 
its own version of communism (Tan 1946: 6). 
The international dimension of the GMD’s conservative turn mirrored the 
party–state’s domestic programme. Under the united front with the communists, 
the GMD participated actively in Comintern-sponsored anti-colonial activities. The 
GMD sent the largest delegation to the 1927 League against Imperialism conference, 
at which the Indian National Congress, represented by Jawaharlal Nehru, was also a 
participant (Prashad 2007: 16–30). The reasons for Dai’s displeasure with communist 
internationalism were plain. China could not afford to contribute to world revolution 
before securing its own independence and economic development (Dai 1928: 8–11). 
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In other words, proletarian rootlessness was anathema to nationalism. China could 
only appeal to international sympathy through ‘peaceful’ means, lest Comintern anti-
imperialism result in further ‘international oppression’ (ibid.). Rather than confronting 
imperialism, Dai prescribed gradualism, conciliation and a revolution of consciousness. 
As the economy waited for development with the help of ‘German science and 
American machinery’, the GMD could work not on empowering the masses, but, in 
his typical Buddhism-infused diction, bringing about confi dence, spiritual renewal and 
self-awakening (juewu) (ibid., 14, 25). Cooperation with foreign capital, along with 
a renewal of the Confucian cosmopolitan virtues of benevolence and universal love, 
would somehow free China and other Asian peoples from the shackles of imperial-
ism and capitalism and propel the world to a blissful state of great union (datong), a 
Confucian concept that also appealed to Tan (Dai 1951: 27–29). Dai’s anti-capitalist 
rhetoric regardless, his appeal to peace, spirituality and civilizational unity amounted 
to a denial of organized confrontation with imperialism and global capitalism. 
Institutionally, the displacement of the GMD’s foreign engagement from socialist 
internationalism to Confucian Pan-Asianism took the form of the New Asia Society, 
a party-funded body inaugurated in 1931, in none other than the premises of the 
Examination Yuan. Echoing late imperial states’ management of areas beyond China 
proper, the New Asia Society was committed to the revival of all Asian civilizations, 
including both foreign peoples and what the nationalists considered as non-Han Chinese 
such as Tibetans and the Manchus (Kubo 2002: 81). Aside from opinions on how best 
to integrate the contested areas on China’s peripheries into Nanjing’s national space, 
the society’s in-house publication, New Asia, promoted overseas nationalist movements 
that the editors deemed ideologically commendable.2 The Indian ‘revolution’, as the 
Congress-led independence movement was called, featured prominently in the journal, 
with Tan a main interpreter of Gandhi’s political programme. Deeply impressed by 
Gandhi’s principle of non-violence, Tan wrote regularly on his meetings with senior 
Congress members and translated the Mahatma’s writings into Chinese, including a 
piece on the dalit (ibid., 88–124). Tan’s interest in Gandhian anti-colonialism and social 
engineering resonated with Dai, who responded enthusiastically to Tagore’s call for 
‘renewing’ cultural ties between China and India. The great ‘Draftsman of the Chinese 
Nationalist Party’, Tan enthused, ‘ha[d] the profoundest love and greatest respect’ 
for India and the Congress. Deemed the Chinese equivalent of Nehru, Tan further 
noted the GMD elder’s achievements in wresting Sun Yat-sen’s political philosophy 
away from communist appropriation by drawing on ‘traditional values’ and appealing 
to ‘nationalistic and democratic revolution’ rather than class struggle (Tan 1948: iv). 
Having rejected cooperation with communism, the GMD and the Indian anti-colonial 
movement could still maintain their ties by appealing to Pan-Asianism, nationalism 
and a shared wariness of social revolution. 
2 For a sampling of New Asia articles on China’s ‘frontier’, see Duara (2003: 190–201).
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REMEMBERING XUANZANG
Tagore’s disdain for the exclusionary and violent tendencies in nationalist mobilization is 
well documented (Guha 1992: 76–90). Yet, the boundary between Tagore’s idealization 
of Asian aesthetic spirituality and right-wing nationalist politics was often blurry. In 
the midst of the Russo-Japanese War, he congratulated Japanese soldiers for refusing to 
be ‘mere cogs in the wheel’ and repudiating Western mechanized warfare through their 
willingness to sacrifi ce for their emperor (Bharucha 2006: 58). It would be unreasonable 
to expect Tagore to foresee that absolute loyalty towards the emperor, like Pan-Asian 
unity, would become a core feature of Japanese ultranationalism in the 1930s. As a 
critic of nationalism and continental expansionism, the Bengali poet and his many 
admirers in Japan indeed did not see eye to eye. Yet, while Tagore was consistent in 
his denunciation of nationalistic violence, which he associated with Western industrial 
modernity, he was much less forthright in confronting ideological strands that in-
formed Japanese expansion into continental Asia. Thus, in his renowned debate with 
the Japanese modernist poet Yone Noguchi, Tagore’s categorical denunciation of Japan’s 
aggression against China was juxtaposed with the striking lamentation that ‘the land 
of Bushido, of great Art and traditions of noble heroism’ was being conquered by the 
‘scientifi c savagery’ of modern mass warfare (Tagore 1999: 209). The violence that 
appalled Tagore so deeply was inseparable from what he saw as the fundamental fl aw 
of capitalist modernity: the reduction of valiant humanity into the Taylorized average 
masses deployed in not only industrialized warfare but also political mobilization of 
both the left and the right. It was as much Japan’s submission to Western modernity 
as the devastation it brought upon the rest of Asia that rendered Noguchi’s vision of a 
Pan-Asianist alliance against Western imperialism disingenuous. Nationalistic activism 
stemming from nostalgia for traditional hierarchies and orders, or the voluntarism of a 
disciplined mass, did not trouble Tagore quite that much (Guha 1992: 79–89). Refusing 
to interrogate how anti-modernist celebration of Asian spiritual purity and vitality 
might have been an integral part of Japanese militarism, Tagore simply shifted his 
Pan-Asianist longing from ‘the land of Bushido’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘unconquerable’ 
China (Tagore 1999: 210). 
Not coincidentally, on the Chinese side, it was Dai Jitao who used to wax lyrical 
on the indomitable Japanese spirit before the Second Sino-Japanese War. The party 
ideologue urged his compatriots to appreciate the martial (shangwu) yet gentle (pinghe) 
and cooperative (huzhu) spirit of the Japanese, which he attributed to a combination 
of Japan’s native Shinto and Confucian and Buddhist teachings the country imported 
from China and India (Dai 2005: 156–57). The virile life of the Japanese stood in 
sharp contrast to the debauchery and effeminacy of China, where people engaged 
in ongoing political strife and ‘meaningless debates’ (ibid., 39). Factional struggles 
were rife within the GMD, but it was improbable that Dai was not also thinking 
about the communist ideological challenge as he appealed for national unity and his 
increasingly untenable wish for China and Japan to join hands to revive Asia. In fact, 
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cultural and racial affi nities aside, alliance with the staunchly anti-communist Japan 
was a way for Nationalist China to counter the infl uence of Soviet Russia, which Dai 
deemed as China’s natural nemesis (Dai 1959a: 372). Exorcizing his party’s recent 
history of involvement in socialist internationalism, Dai’s Pan-Asianism was pitched 
as an alternative anti-Western alliance. The dream of a Sino-Japanese anti-imperialist 
alliance was soon dashed, but GMD Pan-Asianists soon found a more amiable partner 
in Gandhi’s nationalist movement and associated fi gures like Tagore and Tan. 
When Tan travelled to Nanjing to raise funds for Visva Bharati’s Chinese studies 
programme, he benefi tted from the gradual convergence of Chinese and Indian Pan-
Asianisms. Tan’s return to China coincided with the Guandong Army’s invasion of 
Manchuria and the subsequent establishment of Manchukuo, an empire-building 
process steeped in Pan-Asianist discourses and practices associated with Japan’s radical 
right (Duara 2003: 111–22). As Dai fi nally became disillusioned with Japan’s ambitions, 
he and his colleagues in the nationalist state increased their support for Tagore’s 
representative. In 1933, the Sino-Indian Cultural Society in China was initiated in 
Nanjing, with a view to funding cultural and academic ties with India. The Indian 
chapter of the society was founded a year later in Santiniketan. Senior members of 
nationalist parties from both countries served in the committees of their corresponding 
chapters. The Indian chapter’s list of honorary presidents included fi gures of no lesser 
stature than Gandhi, Nehru, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. Its own claim of being 
‘non-political’ nonetheless, the society was unmistakably a product of the vicissitudes 
of Asia’s two biggest nationalist movements.3 
The Sino-Indian Cultural Society and the nationalist regime gave substantial fi nan-
cial backing to the vision of an alliance between China and India, mediating contact 
between Nanjing and the Congress through the 1930s and the 1940s without unduly 
alarming the British Raj. The alliance was crafted in terms of a disinterested relation-
ship between two great Asian civilizations, in sharp contrast to the tension-ridden, 
and often violent, interaction between modern European states. Tagore’s 1937 speech 
marking the opening of the Chinese-funded Cheena Bhavana, or Chinese Hall, at Visva 
Bharati amounted to nothing less than a proposal for an alternative world order to the 
capitalist system of competing nation-states. Sino-Indian relations, Tagore declared, 
would not be beset by confl icting interests because the Indians, as a colonized people, 
did not have a state. India’s lack, however, would prove to be an advantage since ‘not 
know[ing] how to help you or injure you materially’, Tagore and his compatriots could 
be nothing other than ‘your guests, your hosts, your brothers and your friends’. He 
categorically condemned capitalist globalization and its attendant system of nation-
states, decrying that ‘in a world so closely knit by railways, steamships and air lines’, 
a ‘wrong kind of nearness’ brought about a ‘terrorised world’ of blunder, oppression 
and invasion at the expense of ‘peaceful races’ (Tagore 1957b: 42). He hailed what he 
3 See, for example, the back cover of Sino-Pamphlet No. 11, Goodwill Messages to India, which ironically 
carries a collection of Dai Jitao’s speeches delivered in India.
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saw as the fi rst step towards revitalizing India and China’s ‘exchange of gifts’ as ‘noble 
friends’ as an antidote to the alienation and violence of industrial modernity. ‘The moral 
force which has given quality to our civilization’—cooperation and love, mutual trust 
and mutual aid—would empower humans to ‘assimilate’ twentieth century scientifi c 
advances. Otherwise, Tagore warned in apocalyptic language, science would ‘dominate 
and enslave them’ (Tagore 1957b: 41–43). Tagore’s generous musing of a harmonious 
global order centred on Sino-Indian cultural fusion was echoed by Dai when he visited 
Cheena Bhavana in 1940. Dai saw the revival of Sino-Indian interaction, the origins of 
which he traced to Tagore’s 1923 visit to China, as signs of the two countries regaining 
their past glory. Rejuvenated circulation of Buddhist art, personnel and scriptures 
between the two societies was touted as important contributions to world peace and 
human welfare (Dai 1959c: 1291–92). 
Tagore and Dai’s idealization of Sino-Indian cultural fusion free from consideration 
of competing interests between nation-states was refl ected in the research and teaching 
programmes at Cheena Bhavana. Chinese and Indian languages, literatures, history, 
religions and philosophy were all under the purview of the institute, but ‘Buddhism 
[was] regarded as the nucleus of all such studies’ (General Rules of Visva-Bharati, 1937; 
cited in Tan 1957: 20). One highlight of Cheena Bhavana’s publication programme 
was the ‘restoration’ of lost Sanskrit works that were translated into Chinese or Tibetan 
since the seventh century into Indian languages (Rules Regarding Studies in Cheena-
Bhavana, 1937; cited in Tan 1957: 20). Aside from scholars of Indian, Chinese and 
Tibetan Buddhism, faculty members had expertise in the languages, philosophy and art 
of the three cultures. Compared to classical studies and religion, modern topics were 
given much less attention. Except for one specialist who worked on modern Chinese 
literature, nobody at Cheena Bhavana wrote anything substantial on modern topics. 
The only scholar who wrote regularly on modern China and its relations with India 
was Tan Yunshan (Tan 1957: 56–59). The day-to-day functioning of Cheena Bhavana 
conformed to Tagore and Dai’s romantic retracing of the trail blazed by the seventh 
century Chinese Buddhist monk Xuanzang. 
PAN-ASIANISM IN ACTION
Cheena Bhavana’s privileging of philological and classical studies does not mean that 
the institute shied away from contemporary politics. The escalating violence in Asia 
and other parts of the world embroiled Cheena Bhavana deeply in the geopolitics of 
the Pacifi c War, particularly the delicate issue of how to reconcile the Pan-Asianist 
desire for an ethical world order centred on an alliance between independent India 
and China and the ongoing persistence of the British Raj. The urgency that engulfed 
Santiniketan was well captured in a 1939 letter Tagore sent to Tan, who was then in 
China mediating between the GMD and the Congress as Japan encroached further 
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into continental Asia. Tagore urged Tan to return to India, suggesting that he could 
help China’s cause better by ‘disseminating true news about the Sino-Japanese confl ict’ 
against ‘the ever progressing Japanese propaganda’ (Tagore 1957a: 40). By 1939, indeed, 
regular contact between Nanjing and the Congress had been established. Two Congress 
presidents, Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, both from the party’s left wing, had 
expressed support for China’s resistance against Japan, and Dai was to be the fi rst senior 
nationalist to visit India a year later (Dai 1959e: 1645; L. Tan 1999: 6). In retrospect, 
it is tempting to see these developments as the beginning of a wartime Pan-Asianist 
alliance between Nationalist China and the Indian independence movement. 
Reality, however, was much less sanguine. Not all members of the Congress were 
willing to join British India’s war efforts against Japan, especially when the colonizers 
were reluctant to meet the party’s demand for independence. Not a few Indian nation-
alists were unsurprisingly sympathetic to Japan’s Pan-Asianism, with which Tagore 
and Dai were once fascinated. Bose’s abrupt switch in 1941 to allying with Japan and 
mobilization of militant Indians attracted to Japan’s call for an anti-imperialist Asian 
alliance was no doubt the most scandalous case of Indian nationalism’s vicissitudes 
vis-à-vis Japanese imperialism. Yet even Gandhi, who was hardly a Pan-Asianist, ex-
pressed as late as April 1942 that he was willing to negotiate with the Japanese empire 
as long as independence was secured for India. As a bourgeois nationalist, he was 
under pressure from industrialists who feared destruction of their properties during 
fi ghting between Allied forces and the Japanese. It was Nehru who convinced Gandhi 
and the Congress at large to support Allied forces in their India-based activities (Voigt 
2004: 366–67). 
Gandhi’s assurance to Chiang that all the Congress’s decisions would ‘lead to the 
strengthening of India’s and China’s defence’ in July 1942 was thus a result of intense 
political manoeuvring in which Cheena Bhavana played an indispensable role. Tan 
heeded Tagore’s call and went back to Santiniketan, focusing his energy on galvaniz-
ing Indian popular support for China by contributing to nationalist journals like the 
Modern Review. As Principal of Cheena Bhavana, he hosted Dai Jitao in 1940 and 
facilitated the fi rst, and coincidently the last, face-to-face dialogue between Tagore and 
a senior nationalist offi cial. In February 1942, Chiang Kai-shek, now the supreme com-
mander of Allied forces of the China theatre, spent two days in Santiniketan with his 
wife while on an offi cial visit to New Delhi. There, the Chiangs held a series of talks 
with Nehru, by far the most sympathetic among Congress leaders to China’s cause. The 
talks followed those held during Nehru’s visit to Chongqing in 1939. Nehru’s support 
for China was reciprocated by Chiang’s open plea to Britain for Indian independence. 
That the ‘private’ Cheena Bhavana was a GMD-sponsored concretization of the modern 
spiritual construction called Asia provided a most fi tting backdrop for discussion of 
Sino-Indian collaboration. Adding to the signifi cance of the Cheena Bhavana as the 
realization of GMD’s Pan-Asianist longings, the Chiangs donated 80,000 rupees to 
the institute, of which 50,000 went to a memorial dedicated to the recently deceased 
Rabindranath Tagore. 
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Yet, even as Nehru’s anti-Japanese stance was adopted as offi cial Congress policy, 
the united front presented by China and the Indian independence movement was 
unstable from the beginning. The Sino-Indian alliance was forged by appealing 
partly to the two societies’ cultural commonality as ‘Asian’, and partly to a mutual 
revulsion of foreign intrusion. The alliance did not imply agreement on the strategies 
necessary to rid the two countries of imperialism, or indeed on the reasons for much 
of Asia’s subjugation under foreign political and economic interests. The Pan-Asianist 
enterprise that brought Tagore’s humanism, Tan’s Buddhism and Dai’s conservative 
cosmopolitanism together lacked a socio-political vision. Grounded in the aesthetic 
instead of the socio-economic, Pan-Asianism as sponsored by the GMD called for a 
global order of ethical renewal. During his visit to Cheena Bhavana in January 1940, 
Tan’s religious mentor, Taixu, echoed Tagore in telling Nehru that the present military 
crisis was attributable to Western modernity, which reduced humans to inorganic or 
material matters (Yinshun 1995: 251). In striking messianic rhetoric, Dai envisioned 
that China and India would act together and bring their moral rectitude to bear by 
‘subduing the demons that harassed the world and delivering salvation to humankind’ 
(Dai 1959d: 1333–35). Finally, while pleading with the British to give Indians ‘real 
political power’, Chiang reminded Indians of the ‘noble spirit of self-sacrifi ce’ which 
they shared with the Chinese since antiquity and which ‘should drive them to self-
negation for the salvation of mankind’ (Chiang 1969: 665–68).4 Amidst the evocation 
of sacrifi ce, salvation and moral determination, Asia’s fi ght against imperialism became 
a nebulous will to overcome the debased, materialistic West. Alarmingly, a variant of 
his drive to transcend ‘materialism’ was couched in terms of Japan’s quest to replace 
mass consumer society with a new ‘East Asia cultural sphere’ (Harootunian 2000: 
47–65). It was only that this endeavour took the form of a military showdown between 
Japan and the ‘West’. 
While Nehru did not shy away from the rhetoric of cultural commonality, his idea 
of Asian solidarity was clearly conditioned by his unease with capitalist social relations 
and analysis of the political and social conjuncture that produced the Second World 
War. He spoke warmly of Nationalist China and pledged support, appealing more 
to political affi nities as fellow-nationalist movements than to ancient or civilizational 
ties. On ‘Asia’ as an alternative to a world dominated by the ‘West’, Nehru’s assessment 
differed signifi cantly from Tagore’s. As late as August 1939, Tagore was still hoping 
Japan could retain her soul and not lose it to industrialized mass warfare. Nehru gently 
declined the poet’s suggestion that he visit Japan after his trip to China, refusing to 
indulge in the illusion that Japan could be converted to ‘peaceful and democratic ways’ 
(Nehru 1977: 87–88). Indeed, purported racial affi nities and the shared hatred for 
European domination did not endear Nehru to Japan, whose fascism he deemed as 
a vicious form of imperialism (Nehru 1976: 210). The left-leaning nationalist saw in 
China less a moral force that promised to save humankind from the nadir of Western 
4 The message was delivered as a radio broadcast by the English-speaking Soong May-ling.
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materialistic nihilism than a worthwhile partner in the global anti-fascist struggle of 
which India’s own fi ght against British imperialism was a part. 
When Nehru wrote in the United States (US)-based journal, Fortune, in 1942 that 
Asia and Africa would play a critical role in determining the outcome of the Second 
World War, he meant nations that were subjected to the forces of imperialism and 
fascism (Nehru 2007b: 501). Nehru’s notion of Asia—which he often mentioned 
alongside Africa, Spain and Soviet Russia—was thus not a geographical or cultural 
category pitched against Western civilization but colonized and semi-colonized 
peoples united in a global fi ght against imperialism. The imprint of his involvement 
in Comintern anti-colonialism, an experience which the GMD would rather forget, 
is obvious. Indeed, the Soviet experiment, like nationalist movements elsewhere, was, 
for Nehru, a laudable attempt to put an end to the hegemony of ‘fi nance-imperialism’ 
and the ‘capitalist West’ (Nehru 2007a: 479–85). Nehru’s ‘Asia’ was a call for social 
changes which, for colonized peoples, was inseparable from the quest for national 
independence. 
FROM ‘ASIA’ TO THE ‘THIRD WORLD’
Nehru’s internationalism was at odds with the GMD’s faith in a morally pristine Asia 
and deep suspicion of communism. Yet more immediately noticeable rifts occurred 
within the Congress as Gandhi and the party’s right wing, dismayed by Britain’s in-
transigence, decided that India’s independence could be secured under Japanese and 
Axis hegemony. With the launching of the Quit India Movement, Tan found himself 
pleading for Sino-Indian solidarity in a discourse that was much closer to Nehru’s 
internationalism than to Tagore or Dai’s Pan-Asianism. Disclaiming in September 
1942 that as a ‘simple Chinese Buddhist scholar’, he had no interest in politics, Tan 
nonetheless proceeded to caution his ‘Indian brethren’ against Japanese pretense to 
anti-imperialism and support for India’s independence. He even found it necessary 
to refute Gandhi, whose non-violence policy and spiritualism he strongly admired, 
and the Congress’s argument that shifting from languishing under British imperialism 
to living within the Japanese sphere of infl uence amounted to nothing more than a 
‘change of Master’. Faced with the military prowess of a German-backed Japan, Tan 
adopted Nehru’s position in urging India to support the Allies in order to save the 
world and India’s aspiration for independence from ‘be[ing] trampled under Hitler’s 
iron heel’ (Y. Tan 1999: 217–20). Tan’s rare move away from his primary concern in 
‘cultural intercourse and co-operation’ (ibid., 217) was a tacit acknowledgement that 
Pan-Asianism, with its inherent contradictions, ambiguities and mysticism, was no 
stable basis for a nationalist movement busy revising its strategies amidst the changing 
contours of global military and ideological confl icts.
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A much less documented, but perhaps more illuminating, incident revealing the 
limits of this idealist Pan-Asian diplomacy concerned the quiet unravelling of the 
alliance between Nationalist China and independent India in the few years leading 
up to the Cold War. In 1947, Tan played the unoffi cial diplomat again, as member 
of China’s delegation to the Asian Relations Conference. The conference, held in the 
heady days shortly before the creation of the Indian state in 1947, was envisioned by 
Nehru as a forum to assert Asia’s independence from European and American inter-
ests. Asian countries, he declared, must ‘have their own policies in world affairs’ and 
independent ‘political, social and economic structure’. The prime minister-designate 
mentioned again Asia’s affi nity with Africa as fellow-colonized peoples fi ghting for 
national independence (Nehru 1948: 24–26). As an independent Asian nation-state, 
India was to have no part in helping the capitalist West in its suppression of communist 
and other national liberation movements in Southeast Asia, which Nehru saw not as 
malicious expansion of the Soviet empire but legitimate anti-colonial struggles (Nehru 
2007c: 520). These strategies were to form the core of the anti-colonial non-aligned 
movement which Nehru and Zhou Enlai, premier of Communist China, gave rise to 
at the 1955 Bandung Conference (Prashad 2007: 31–50).5 
The radical tone of Nehru alarmed the GMD, whose Pan-Asianist affi nities with 
India were strained by its increasing involvement in the US-led global campaign against 
communism and its Chinese variant. Nanjing was also frustrated that Tibet, sovereignty 
over which Dai and Tan engaged in claiming, was extended an invitation to join the 
conference. In an article written for the GMD headquarters, Dai argued that while 
Nationalist China could not afford to simply turn down Nehru’s invitation, it should 
send a delegation of academics and avoid commenting on anything of substance like 
international relations because ‘China’s position was different’ from India as far as 
Europe and the US were concerned (Dai 1959b: 386–87). These ‘scholars of pure 
mind’, comprised of Tan and fi gures chosen from such GMD-affi liated organizations as 
the New Asia Society, the Sino-Indian Cultural Society or the Three People’s Principles 
Youth Corps, were sent as a subtle snub of Nehru’s plea for Third World solidarity. 
When Tan suggested, apparently nothing more than echoing the Sino-Indian Cultural 
Society, that an All Asia Cultural Association be set up to promote Asian culture and 
world peace, he was lampooning ‘our fashionable socialist friends’, to which Nehru 
probably belonged, and their vision of social change (Tan 1949: 6–9). Tan did suggest 
in another article, written not for the conference but for a magazine, that an ‘Asia 
Union’, with the multi-ethnic Singapore as its capital, be formed. But that Asia Union, 
as part of the Great World Union (datong), would be bound by nothing but amity, 
mutual help and self-sacrifi ce to offset the self-interest that energized imperialism, 
including that of Soviet Russia (ibid., 14–19). Tan was quick to assure that his musing 
on a post-national order was not intended to upset the status quo or ‘existing powers 
5 For a much less generous assessment of the accomplishments of Bandung and the Third World project, 
see Ahmad (1992: 293–314).
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and interests’ (ibid., 18). The apparently ambitious proposal for global and Asian 
unity, which under another set of circumstances played a pioneering role in mediating 
between the two nationalist movements of China and India, marked the parting of 
ways between the GMD’s staunch anti-communism and the left nationalism of the 
newly created Indian state in the emerging Cold War order.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF PAN-ASIANISM
Both Cheena Bhavana and the Sino-Indian Cultural Society, re-founded as a body 
based solely in India, survived the fi nancial fallout of China’s communist revolution. As 
a member of an Indian state-funded university, Tan Yunshan welcomed Zhou Enlai to 
Cheena Bhavana in 1957 and received a one-off donation from the communist premier 
(Tan 1957: 50). This, however, could not hide the fact that the school no longer had 
the signifi cance in Sino-Indian relations that it once possessed. This shift was partly 
a result of the presence of formal state-to-state diplomacy and the unravelling of the 
British empire, which rendered the mediating role of ‘apolitical’ fi gures like Tan, with 
his connections in and freedom of movement between various British colonies in Asia, 
less important. It also marked the fact that the Pan-Asianist idealism that Tagore and 
Tan represented was no longer compatible with the internationalist agendas of either 
independent India or Maoist China.
That the romantic longing for the unity of Asia as a religious and aesthetic category 
was no blueprint for political action was, in a way, to be expected. Tan emphasized 
numerous times that he cared about nothing but culture, even when he was obviously 
making political statements. This seemingly contradictory claim suggested not that 
Tan was disingenuous but that his involvement in state affairs and vision of Asia was 
not tainted by consideration of interest, ‘self-preservation’ or, as Taixu and Dai often 
put it, materialism. In fact, the privileging of culture in the Visva Bharati experiment 
was informed by a renunciation of social purpose and productive labour, a result of 
Tagore’s disillusionment with Swadeshi mobilization (Sartori 2008: 188–89). Tagore 
and Tan’s plea for Asia to replace the calculated violence of modernity took on the 
universalist quality of Kantian aesthetics, in that it effectively proposed a complete dis-
regard of interest and the gravity of political power structures and social relations 
(Eagleton 1990: 97). 
 The pitfalls of this disinterested aesthetics were succinctly revealed by Karatani 
Kôjin in his analysis of the ambiguous relationship between many Japanese intellectuals 
and state expansionism during the Pacifi c War. Reading wartime fi gures like Yasuda 
Yojûrô and Nishida Kitarô, whose intellectual genealogy could be traced to the great 
Pan-Asianist Okakura Tenshin, Karatani observes how romantic disinterestedness 
negated the task of overwhelming social contradictions as any aporia was deemed to 
have been sublated a priori in one’s consciousness. This procedure allowed Yasuda, 
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Nishida and others to deny the need for active political programmes and simply attri-
bute the surmounting of contradictions to present developments. Thus, Japan’s Greater 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was idealized as being a superior alternative to both the 
capitalist nation-state system and Soviet internationalism (Karatani 2005: 106–14). 
Tan and Tagore, to be sure, had no illusion about Japan’s continental ambitions. Yet, 
their call for Asia’s spiritual unity and disdain for any consideration of interest resulted 
in a politics that dovetailed nicely with the GMD’s anti-revolutionary revolution of 
consciousness as the party actively oppressed any ‘materialist’ challenge to the social 
structure. Tagore’s paean to Chiang Kai-shek in his debates with Yone Noguchi or Tan’s 
pledge that his proposal of Asia Union would accommodate Cold War geopolitical 
confi gurations were certainly no GMD propaganda, but they did not contribute to 
effective critiques of twentieth century imperialism either.
The spread of civilization discourse since the mid-nineteenth century as a trans-
national means of imagining and constructing autonomous collective subjects free from 
both social determinants such as economics and Western domination was contingent on 
the temporality of capitalist modernity (Sartori 2008: 21–22, 43–47). It is thus hardly 
surprising that in the last decade or so, the rise of the Indian and Chinese nation-states 
as enthusiastic participants in the capitalist world order has injected contemporary 
relevance to the remarkable careers of Tagore and Tan in the fi rst half of the twentieth 
century. Tagore’s literary corpus circulates in the Chinese market as a treasure trove 
of Valentine’s Day messages and ‘soothing balm’ for pressurized white-collar workers. 
Even his Pan-Asianism, long an object of ridicule for the Chinese communists, seems 
to be re-emerging as an attractive possibility set against the ongoing Euroamerica-
centred fi nancial crisis (Basu 2010), not unlike how Asia was touted as an alternative 
civilization to war-ridden Europe in the wake of the Great War. In India, China and 
elsewhere, Tan Yunshan’s equally peripatetic son Chung, a historian of China, inherits 
his father’s mission by calling for a geo-civilizational paradigm to envision a future 
relationship between the two societies to replace hard-nosed geopolitical calculations 
(Tan 2009). While Tan Chung’s model of ‘Chindian interactivism’ draws directly 
from the Asian spiritualism Cheena Bhavana embodied, it has reconciled to the 
fact that the two societies are now full-fl edged nation-states. Having witnessed the 
dramatic deterioration of Sino-Indian relations in the 1960s, Tan Chung is much 
more forthcoming in critiquing the virulent effects of right-wing nationalisms and 
rivalries backed by the two Cold War superpowers (Tan 2006: 25–26). More notably, 
in the same preface to a Chinese translation of a book written by the Congress pol-
itician Jairam Ramesh, a main fi gure in Manmohan Singh’s economic liberalization 
programme, Tan Chung gently rebuked the argument that contemporary India–China 
interactions are ultimately conditioned by realist considerations. Citing Nehru’s 
internationalist solidarity with China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, he observes 
that while economic interests are important, one should not be too quick to discount 
ethical and political principles (ibid., 30–31). Lying not far beneath evocations of 
Xuanzang and Tagore are pointed complaints about the Cold War experience and 
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ongoing economic globalization. Whether revived pleas for Sino-Indian fusion adopt a 
more critical edge and point towards genuine rapprochement between the two societies 
or merely serve as the backdrop to the integration of two expanding economies would 
be of great interest far beyond the academic community. 
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